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Abstract 
In a sample of 27 OECD countries, this paper investigates whether the event of a 
national election induces higher stock market volatility. It is found that the country-
specific component of index return variance can easily double during the week around 
the Election Day, which attests to the fact that investors are surprised by the actual 
election outcome. Several factors like narrow margin of victory, lack of compulsory 
voting laws, change in the political orientation of the government, or the failure to form 
a coalition with a majority of seats in parliament significantly contribute to the 
magnitude of the election shock. Our findings have important implications for the 
optimal strategies of risk-averse stock market investors and participants of the option 
markets.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Country’s politics can exert significant influence on its income distribution and 
prosperity. In democratic states, voters elect parties which best represent their personal 
beliefs and interests. According to partisan theory propounded by Hibbs (1977), leftist 
governments tend to prioritize the reduction of unemployment, whereas right-wing 
governments attribute higher social costs to inflation. Another influential theory 
presented by Nordhaus (1975) postulates that, irrespective of their political orientation, 
incumbents will pursue policies that maximize their chances of re-election. As a result, 
they will try to self-servingly attune the business cycle to the timing of elections. The 
economy will be stimulated by unsustainable expansionary policies before the elections, 
and harsh actions aimed at curbing the resultant inflation will have to follow at the 
beginning of the new term of office. It has to be noted, however, that any policy-
induced cycles in real activity will be ephemeral if the economic agents and voters have 
rational expectations (Alesina, 1987; Rogoff, 1990). 
Several recent papers look at whether security returns are impacted by politics. 
Booth and Booth (2003) report that the U.S. stock market tends to perform better in the 
second half of the presidential term. This phenomenon could be a reflection of the 
political business cycle but can also be explained behaviorally. The authors argue that 
investors may be over-optimistic about the implications of the impending elections, but 
their optimism wears off quickly once the new administration fails to keep its election 
campaign promises. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) show that the market excess 
return was higher under Democrat than Republican presidencies throughout the period 
from 1927 to 1998. This anomaly cannot be explained away by variation in business 
condition proxies. Additional evidence is provided by Nofsinger (2004), who contends 
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that the stock market is a barometer of public sentiment and its movements can indicate 
whether incumbents will be re-elected.  
Our inquiry adds to the discussion on the interplay between politics and stock 
prices in meaningful ways. Most of the previous empirical studies focus exclusively on 
U.S. data.1 Since elections are essentially rare events, the single-country approach leads 
to a small sample and many statistical problems specific to it. To overcome this 
obstacle, the data set compiled for this study covers 27 industrialized nations. 
Furthermore, the basic conceptual framework proposed here departs slightly from the 
convention adopted in prior literature. Instead of examining the fortunes of the stock 
market throughout the tenure of different administrations, this analysis concentrates on 
the return variability around election dates. Evidence of extreme price movements in 
these periods will lend support to the conjecture that market participants tend to be 
surprised by the actual election results.  
The investigation into return volatility is warranted on at least three grounds. First, 
the uncertainty about the election outcome has important implications for risk-averse 
investors. Prior research has shown that investors are undiversified internationally and 
exhibit a significant home bias (French and Poterba, 1991; Baxter and Jermann, 1997). 
Since they hold predominantly domestic assets, the country-specific political risk will 
not diffuse in their portfolios. Consequently, the sole event of elections in their home 
country could have serious implications for the risk level of their portfolios. Second, 
any market-wide fluctuations in response to election shocks will augment the systematic 
volatility of all stocks listed. It is therefore conceivable that option prices could increase 
around the time when voters cast their ballots. Finally, the results reported here can be 
                                                 
1 In addition to the aforementioned Booth and Booth (2003), Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003), and 
Nofsinger (2004), several earlier papers deal with the issue of an election cycle in U.S. security returns. 
See Niederhoffer et al. (1970), Riley and Luksetich (1980), Allvine and O’Neill (1980), Herbst and 
Slinkman (1984), Huang (1985), Stovall (1992), Hensel and Ziemba (1995), Gärtner and Wellershoff 
(1995), and Johnson et al. (1999). 
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of interest to pollsters as they provide indirect evidence on whether the accuracy of pre-
election forecasts suffices for practical applications. An observation of substantial 
volatility hikes around an Election Day would indicate that the efforts to formulate 
precise predictions should be furthered and additional resources need to be directed 
towards this end.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
systematic review of the techniques used in election forecasting, and discusses the 
accuracy of these techniques. Section 3 outlines the methodological framework in which 
the null hypothesis of no election surprise is tested. The description of the data set and 
discussion of empirical results follow in the two subsequent sections. Sections 6 and 7 
investigate the robustness of results and implications for investors. The last section 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Predicting election outcomes 
 
Public opinion surveying has become an integral part of today’s political 
landscape. In the heat of election campaigns, the results of major surveys appear as 
cover-page stories, and politicians commission private polls, which provide them with 
strategic information. Pre-election surveying has a long and intriguing history, but it has 
to be noted that many of the early polls were plagued with serious methodological 
problems, which rendered their predictions unreliable (Squire, 1988; Cahalan, 1989). It 
was not until the 1930s that scientific procedures such as quota sampling were 
introduced (Gallup and Robinson, 1938). Having realized the importance of appropriate 
sample selection, polltakers began improving their statistical apparatus, gradually 
moving towards probability sampling and other hybrid methods.  
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When conducting a survey, canvassers can interview subjects face-to-face, either 
by intercepting them on the street or by visiting sampled households. The unit costs of 
face-to-face interviewing can be quite high, especially if attempts to create a 
geographically representative sample are made. For this reason, the polling industry 
abandoned this method and embraced telephone-based surveys. The phone numbers of 
respondents could be drawn at random from a telephone directory. However, to avoid 
any sample biases arising from the systematic exclusion of households with unlisted 
phone numbers, pollsters tend to use random digit dialing systems. Random digit 
dialing is employed by major American polling organizations in their presidential 
election polls (Voss et al., 1995). The results of recent research indicate that this 
technique may be soon superseded by the more cost-effective and reliable method of 
sampling from the voter registration lists (Green and Gerber, 2003). 
The accuracy of survey-based projections may depend on multiple factors, such as 
sampling procedure, number of respondents, or correct identification of likely non-
voters. With their reputation at stake, pollsters are motivated to reduce the margin of 
error by applying the best techniques at their disposal, especially in the case of widely 
followed national elections. For this reason, the major pre-election surveys have 
enjoyed a reasonably good track record ever since scientific polling was adopted. It can 
be calculated from the data released by the National Council on Public Polls that the 
average absolute candidate error for all major U.S. presidential polls between 1936 and 
2000 was 2.32%.2 
Election forecasting also embraces techniques other than polling. For instance, one 
could make use of the fact that election outcomes tend to correlate with macroeconomic 
variables (Kramer, 1971; Grier and McGarrity, 1998). This correlation is observed 
                                                 
2 See the report of O’Neill et al. (2001).  
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because many voters assess economic conditions retrospectively and hold incumbents 
accountable for the efficacy of their policies. Fair (1978) formalized this intuition by 
deriving a model which links the share of two-party vote to such factors as GDP growth 
and inflation. He made subsequent updates of his vote equation and provided forecasts 
for presidential elections (Fair 1982, 1988, 1996, 2002). The ex-post within-sample 
prediction of Fair’s model has been correct with respect to the election winner in all but 
three presidential races held since 1916. The average absolute error of the out-of-sample 
forecasts in the ten elections starting from 1964 equaled 2.58% (Fair, 2004).  
In general, rational investors will strive to assess voter sentiment using all 
available sources of information, such as polls, macroeconomic data, electoral debates, 
or media reports. In an efficient market, their expectations will be aggregated into a 
consensus forecast, and stock prices will move to reflect it. A wealth of empirical 
evidence on how markets aggregate expectations of individual traders comes from the 
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM). These markets are operated by the faculty of Tippie 
College of Business at the University of Iowa and allow individuals to stake their 
money on future election results.  
The IEM is essentially a futures market where trading can be conducted over the 
Internet on a 24-hours-per-day basis. Different types of contracts are listed. In the 
presidential vote-share market, the contracts’ liquidation payoff is a dollar multiple of 
the popular vote percentage received by a given candidate. In the winner-takes-all 
market, contracts are defined as digital options with a payoff of $1 conditional on a 
particular candidate winning the election. The design of the instruments traded on the 
IEM allows the expected election outcome to be easily extracted from the prevailing 
market prices.3  
                                                 
3 More information about the structure of the IEM can be found at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/.  
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Prior research has documented that, although individual traders in the IEM show 
an inclination to overestimate the chances of their preferred candidate and often conduct 
suboptimal transactions, the market in aggregate is an exceptionally accurate predictor 
of the election result (Forsythe et al., 1999; Oliven and Rietz, 2004). The efficiency of 
market prices seems to be assured by marginal traders who arbitrage away any existing 
judgment biases and pricing errors. The prices of contracts are a much better guide to 
the future than polls. An analysis of 15 national elections in six different countries 
performed by Berg et al. (2005) reveals that the absolute error of polls in the week 
before the election was 1.93%, compared with a 1.58% average market error. 
Furthermore, the IEM outperformed over 70% of the long-horizon forecasts generated 
by polling organizations (Berg et al., 2003). New opinion-poll results did not drive the 
market prices and were merely a confirmation of the traders’ collective knowledge 
(Forsythe et al., 1992).  
The preceding discussion characterizes a broad spectrum of techniques and 
information that can be used to evaluate the mood of the electorate. The extant evidence 
indicates that reasonably accurate predictions of voters’ behavior can be formed, but 
whether stock market participants are surprised by the ultimate election outcome 
remains an open empirical question.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
We gauge the impact of elections on the second moment of return distribution 
using a volatility event-study approach. The analysis starts with isolating the country-
specific component of variance within a GARCH(1,1) framework: 
 ),0(~, ,,,
*
, titititti hNRR εεβα ++= , (1) 
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 2 1,21,10, −− ++= tititi hh εγγγ , (2) 
where tiR ,  and 
*
tR  are the continuously compounded returns on the U.S. dollar 
denominated stock market index in country i and the global stock market index on day t, 
respectively. ti,ε  denotes the country-specific part of index returns, and tih ,  stands for 
its conditional volatility. 
(1) and (2) are estimated jointly using the Maximum Likelihood method over a 
period immediately preceding the event window. The convention adopted in the 
literature for the type of event studies described by Brown and Warner (1985) is to use 
250 daily returns to estimate the benchmark model. One year of daily observations, 
however, may be insufficient to accurately model GARCH processes, and a longer 
estimation window is called for. On the other hand, the use of an over-expansive 
window will substantially cut the number of elections that can be included in our 
sample. Guided by these practical considerations and the results of Hwang and Pereira 
(2006), we have decided to choose an estimation period of 500 trading days. 
To measure abnormal volatility, one has to consider the variation in ti,ε  around the 
event date in relation to its regular non-event level. The GARCH model may serve as a 
benchmark, as it can provide an indication of what the volatility would have been, had 
the election not occurred. A word of caution, however, is required. As it stands, (2) is a 
one-step-ahead forecast and will not generate an event-independent projection. The 
immediate impact of an election, as measured by 0,iε , will have a bearing on the values 
of tih ,  for any t > 0. This issue can be easily resolved by making the volatility forecast 
conditional only on the information set available prior to the event. For this reason, the 
volatility benchmark for the k-th day of the event window is defined as a k-step-ahead 
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forecast of the conditional variance based on the information set available on the last 
day of the estimation window t*: 
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The distribution of the residuals during the event window can be described as 
[ ]( )*,, |,~ ttittti hEMARN Ω⋅ε , where Mt is the multiplicative effect of the event on 
volatility, ARt is the event-induced abnormal return, and t > t*. Under the null 
hypothesis that investors are not surprised by election outcomes, the value of parameter 
Mt should equal one. Note that, if the residuals were demeaned using the cross-section 
average, they would be normally distributed with zero mean. Their variance, under the 
assumption of residual orthogonality, would be 
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where EIDRVi,t stands for the event-independent demeaned residual variance and N is 
the number of events included in the sample. 
Since the objective of the study is to quantify the effect of elections on stock 
market volatility, Mt is the parameter of primary interest. The method of estimating this 
event-induced volatility multiple rests on combining residual standardization with a 
cross-sectional approach in the spirit of Boehmer et al. (1991) and Hilliard and Savickas 
(2002). Note that the estimate tMˆ  can be calculated as the cross-sectional variance of 
demeaned residuals, standardized by the event-independent demeaned residual standard 
deviation [ ] 21,tiEIDRV : 
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where )ˆˆ(ˆ *,, ttiti RR βαε +−=  and t > t*.  
Under the null hypothesis, the demeaned standardized residuals follow a standard 
normal distribution because Mt equals one. Consequently, the abnormal percentage 
change in volatility on any day t of the event window is )1ˆ( −tM . For an event window 
(n1,n2), the cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV) can be calculated as 
 ( )1ˆ),( 1221 2
1
+−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∑
=
nnMnnCAV
n
nt
t . (6) 
In the current setting, the null hypothesis of no impact can be expressed in the following 
way: 
 0),(: 210 =nnCAVH , (7) 
which is equivalent to 
 ∑
=
−⋅+−=−2
1
)1()1()1(: 120
n
nt
t NnnNMH . (8) 
Since, under the null, Mt is a variance of N independent N(0,1) random variables, 
2
1~)1(ˆ −− Nt NM χ  and ∑ = +−⋅−−2 1 122 )1()1(~)1(ˆn nt nnNt NM χ . The test statistic for the 
hypothesis stated in (7) is therefore 
 2 )1()1(21 12
2
1
~ˆ)1(),( +−⋅−
=
∑ ⋅−= nnNn
nt
tMNnn χφ . (9) 
The inferences based on the theoretical test will not be robust if the assumptions of 
the underlying econometric model are violated. Potential complications may arise from 
non-normality, cross-sectional dependence, or autocorrelation of the regression 
residuals εi,t. To circumvent these problems and reinforce our results, the statistical 
significance of election impact is additionally tested using the bootstrap methodology of 
Efron (1979). More specifically, the cumulative abnormal volatility during the election 
period is compared with the empirical distribution of CAVs simulated under the null 
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hypothesis. The iterative procedure for generating the empirical distribution can be 
described as follows: 
I. From the entire set of available countries and dates, randomly draw with 
replacement N country/date combinations to match the number of elections 
in the original sample.  
II. Compute the cumulative abnormal volatility using (6) for the randomly 
generated sample over the respective event window.  
III. Repeat steps I and II 5,000 times, and sort the collection of resulting CAVs 
in an ascending order to obtain the empirical distribution. The p-value can 
be defined as the number of bootstrapped CAVs that exceed the CAV 
calculated for the original election sample, divided by the number of 
replications (i.e. 5,000).   
The changes in volatility are also linked to election and country characteristics by 
means of regression analysis. This inquiry closely follows the approach of Dubofsky 
(1991) and Clayton et al. (2005) in that the dependent variable is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the pre-event and event window volatility ratio. The application of the log 
transformation to the variance quotient reduces the skewness of the underlying data and 
thereby leads to more reliable t-statistics. The test statistics and parameter standard 
errors are estimated using the heteroscedasticity-consistent method of White (1980). A 
description of the independent variables used in the regressions follows in the data 
section.  
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4. Data 
 
In an attempt to create a broad international sample, the authors compiled 
information on 27 industrialized nations. This includes all OECD countries, with the 
exception of Iceland, Luxembourg, and Slovakia. As of the time of writing this paper, 
Morgan Stanley Capital International Inc. (MSCI) did not provide data on stock market 
indexes for these three capital markets. The returns for the remaining countries were 
computed using the U.S. dollar denominated MSCI Country Indexes. These are value-
weighted and adjusted for dividend payments. We have further chosen the MSCI World 
Index, which measures the performance of all developed equity markets, as a proxy for 
our global portfolio. The stock market data are sourced from Thomson Financial 
Datastream.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 summarizes some important facts about the 27 countries and 134 elections 
included in our sample. As can be seen from the table, we distinguish between countries 
where parliamentary elections are assumed to be the relevant events and countries 
where presidential elections are investigated instead. This distinction is crucial since we 
combine a panel of countries with heterogeneous political systems and diverse 
constitutional features. In states with a presidential system of government, a President 
holds the positions of both head of state and head of government. Countries with 
presidential systems include the United States, Mexico, and South Korea. Most of the 
countries in our sample, however, operate under parliamentary systems with a Premier 
or Prime Minister as the head of government, and a President or Monarch as the, 
sometimes merely symbolic, head of state. Since our intention is to investigate the 
volatility around those elections that determine the formation of national governments, 
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we have to focus on presidential elections in presidential systems and parliamentary 
elections in parliamentary systems.  
Column 3 of Table 1 indicates the date from which daily observations on the 
respective MSCI Country Indexes can be downloaded from Datastream. For several 
countries, monthly observations became available prior to the dates reported in Table 1. 
It has to be noted, however, that monthly sampling frequency is too low for the 
purposes of our inquiry. While the indexes for most of the developed markets start 
around January 1980, other countries do not have these data available until the end of 
the 1980s or even the beginning of the 1990s. In some cases, this can quite heavily cut 
the number of elections that qualify for inclusion in our sample. The relative paucity of 
data in the time-series dimension vividly highlights the merits of a large cross-section.  
Election dates were mostly obtained from Banks et al. (2004), Caramani (2000), 
and Lane et al. (1991). To double-check the integrity of these data, we conducted 
extensive newspaper and internet searches. For any given country, the date of the first 
election included is solely determined by the MSCI index starting date. Elections that 
took place in the first 500 trading days after the index starting date, however, had to be 
excluded from the sample. This restriction enables us to estimate the volatility 
benchmark model given in (1) and (2) for all of the events considered. The date of the 
last election included (column 5) corresponds to the last election that took place before 
the end of 2004.  
Column 6 reports the total number of elections for each of the countries. The 
maximum of nine elections for Australia can be explained by the early availability of 
index data for this country, combined with a relatively short election cycle of only three 
years and a considerable number of early elections. The minimum of only one 
observation is linked to Greece, which has the shortest MSCI index series. For four 
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countries, only two elections can be included. Among these are the Eastern European 
emerging markets of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, where stock exchanges 
were only re-established after the fall of communism at the beginning of the 1990s, and 
Mexico, where the first election that met international standards of democracy and 
transparency was not held until 1994. 
To pinpoint the determinants of election-induced volatility, we have constructed a 
comprehensive data set of explanatory variables. These variables are meant to provide 
further insights into the political, institutional, and socio-economic factors which could 
influence the magnitude of election shocks. More specifically, the following 
explanatory variables are considered: 
- Parliamentary (dummy variable) captures the difference between parliamentary 
and presidential systems.  
- Minority_Government (dummy variable) indicates elections in which a minority 
government – i.e. a cabinet in a parliamentary system that does not represent a 
majority of seats in parliament – is brought to office.  
- Margin_of_Victory is defined as the difference between the percentage of popular 
votes obtained by government coalition and opposition for parliamentary 
elections, and the corresponding difference between winner and runner-up for 
presidential races. 
- Number_of_Parties indicates the number of independent political parties involved 
in the government coalition for parliamentary systems. It takes a value of one for 
presidential systems.  
 14
- ∆Orientation (dummy variable) indicates a change in the political orientation of 
the government, i.e. a shift from a left-wing to a right-wing government or vice 
versa.4 
- Early_Election (dummy variable) marks early elections, i.e. elections that are 
called more than three months before the official end of the tenure of the 
incumbent administration.5 
- Compulsory_Voting (dummy variable) indicates countries with mandatory voting 
laws. 
- Ln_Population is the natural logarithm of total population in a given country-year.  
- Ln_GDP_per_Capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in a given 
country-year, measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.6 
The last two variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators 
database compiled by the World Bank. The main sources considered and consolidated 
for the construction of the political variables are Alesina and Roubini (1992), Banks et 
al. (2004), Beck et al. (2001), Caramani (2000), Müller and Strøm (2000), and Laver 
and Schofield (1998). The information on compulsory voting comes from a 
comprehensive archive of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance.  
 [Table 2 about here] 
                                                 
4 The classification of governments into a left-wing/right-wing scheme is, of course, far from being 
uncontroversial and may be deemed subjective. Therefore, we stick closely to the conventions adopted in 
Alesina and Roubini (1992), Alt (1985), and Banks et al. (2004). 
5 Alternative specifications considered classified elections as “early” whenever they took place more than 
six or twelve months before the official end of the term. Changes in the definition of this variable, 
however, did not substantially alter our empirical findings. 
6 For the last two variables, the log transformation is applied to reduce the skewness in the underlying 
data. 
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Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables introduced 
above. Parliamentary elections account for 91.8% of our sample, and in almost one-
fourth of the cases, the winning government coalition does not have a majority of seats 
in the parliament. In some countries (especially Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), 
minority governments are the rule rather than exception (Müller and Strøm, 2000). This 
observation may partially explain the negative average victory margin of -2.81%. 
Another explanation that can be offered for this negative mean is that most countries in 
our sample have incorporated majoritarian elements in their electoral systems, thereby 
favoring parties with higher vote shares. This implies that a popular vote share of less 
than 50% (obtained by either a single party or a multi-party coalition) is often sufficient 
for a majority of seats in parliament. The data reported in Table 2 also reveal that a 
median government coalition comprised two independent parties. 
In almost one-third of the cases, a change in the orientation of the government 
takes place, and 41.8% of the elections are called early. In some countries with 
endogenous election timing, governments may regularly be tempted to call early 
elections in order to exploit economic conditions which they judge more promising for 
their re-election (Cargill and Hutchison, 1991). Six of the countries in our sample 
(Australia, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Mexico, and Turkey) have mandatory voting laws, 
but the stringency and enforcement of these laws appears to be country-specific. A non-
voter could, for instance, face a fine, restrictions on employment in the public sector 
(Belgium), or difficulties in obtaining new identification documents (Greece). Finally, 
the population of the countries included in our sample ranges from 3.4 million (New 
Zealand 1990) to 294 million (United States 2004), whereas GDP per capita varies 
between US$ 2,471 (Turkey 1991) and US$ 38,222 (Japan 2003).  
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Return volatility around the election date 
Our empirical investigation starts with the volatility event study described in the 
methodology section. For the purposes of our inquiry, we define the event day as the 
Election Day, except for instances when elections took place during the weekend or on 
a bank holiday. In these cases, day zero is defined as the first trading day after the 
election. The first panel of Fig. 1 depicts the behavior of cumulative abnormal volatility 
around the vote-casting periods. The theoretical and bootstrap p-values for the null 
hypothesis of no increase in country-specific variance are plotted in the second and third 
panel. Both probabilities are truncated at 20%.  
[Fig. 1 about here] 
The plot depicted in Fig. 1 clearly demonstrates that elections are accompanied by 
elevated volatility. A strong abnormal rise starts on the Election Day and continues for a 
number of days thereafter. This prolonged reaction is most probably due to the fact that 
the official results may not be released until several days after the elections. The process 
of counting special votes7 and possible recounts can substantially add to this delay. 
Furthermore, some of the abnormal volatility observed in the later days of the event 
window may also be attributed to ongoing coalition talks or statements issued by the 
newly elected authorities.  
[Table 3 about here] 
                                                 
7 The term “special votes” is used here in relation to votes cast by individuals who, due to certain 
circumstances, are unable to get to the required polling place on the Election Day. This could, for 
instance, be the case when the registered voter is outside her electorate, is seriously ill or hospitalized, or 
her name was mistakenly omitted from the electoral roll.  
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It can be seen from Table 3 that CAV(-25,25) reaches a value of 11.94. At first 
glance, this value may have little intuitive content. An astute reader, however, will 
realize that the ratio of CAV to the total number of days included in the event window 
is, by construction, equal to the percentage increase of the volatility relative to its 
benchmark. This means that, in the 51 days surrounding the elections, the country-
specific component of variance was 23.42% higher than it would have been, had the 
elections not occurred. Narrowing the event window leads to larger implied percentage 
changes, confirming that most of the large stock market moves are concentrated around 
the Election Day. The punch line of Table 3 is that the country-specific return volatility 
can easily double in the week around elections.  
Fig. 1 shows the probabilities for the null of no abnormal reaction in volatility. 
The probabilities drop to nearly zero immediately after the event date. This result is 
corroborated in Table 3 where, at the precision of four decimal places, most of the p-
values are indistinguishable from zero. Regardless of the testing methodology, the null 
is rejected for all of the considered event windows at the 1% significance level or better. 
There are slight differences between the p-values produced by the theoretical and 
bootstrap approaches. The latter can be deemed more reliable, as it does not assume 
normality and independence of returns. Overall, very compelling evidence is found that 
the country-specific component of variance increases dramatically around the event 
date. 
 
5.2. Determinants of election surprise  
We proceed further by attempting to link the magnitude of election shocks to 
several explanatory variables by means of regression analysis. Following the approach 
adopted in prior literature (Dubofsky, 1991; Clayton et al., 2005), we define the 
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dependent variable as a natural logarithm of the volatility ratio. This ratio is constructed 
by dividing the return variance computed over the (-25,25) event window by the 
variance of returns in a pre-event window of equal length, i.e. (-76,-26). To check the 
sensitivity of the regression estimates to the addition of new independent variables, 
several specifications were tried, and the results are reported in Table 4. As can be seen 
from the table, the Margin_of_Victory and Minority_Government variables are not 
bundled together into one equation in order to avoid potential multicollinearity 
problems. There is a strong negative correlation between these variables of almost -0.5, 
which is induced by the fact that minority governments typically have a negative margin 
of victory.   
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reveals that the increase in variance is more pronounced for closely 
contested races. Whenever picking the probable winner is difficult, uncertainty will not 
resolve fully until the official release of election results. Investors also tend to react in a 
more volatile manner when the new government coalition does not hold a majority of 
seats in parliament. This could be, for instance, because the implementation of new 
policies by minority governments is usually a very arduous task. A change in the 
political orientation of the executive also adds to the volatility of stock prices, as 
investors anticipate new directions in economic and redistribution policies. 
We find evidence that mandatory voting reduces the election surprise. At least two 
explanations can be propounded to explain this phenomenon. In the absence of 
compulsory voting laws, individuals holding extreme political views will show an 
above-average proclivity to vote and will be able to distort election outcomes. 
Furthermore, the precision of pre-election polls will depend on whether the interviewers 
have correctly determined which of the respondents are likely not to vote. Political 
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preferences of voters and non-voters may be quite different, which will bias the survey 
predictions (Green and Gerber, 2003). With compulsory voting laws in place, both of 
the problems mentioned above are mitigated.   
Although the remaining regressors lack significant explanatory power, the signs of 
their coefficient estimates appear to be uncontroversial. The jump in volatility is, ceteris 
paribus, greater for presidential races and in cases when the elections are called early. 
Formation of wide government coalitions comprising a large number of independent 
parties can further aggravate the stock market fluctuations. Finally, there seems to be 
less uncertainty about election outcomes in countries with large population and high 
GDP per capita, as numerous and affluent nations can allocate more resources to pre-
election polling. 
 
6. Robustness checks 
 
The event study presented in the previous section focuses on the country-specific 
component of volatility. An obvious extension of this analysis would be to investigate 
the behavior of total variance, which is influenced by both domestic and international 
developments. Table 5 reports the average unconditional variances computed for 
different time intervals around the elections. These figures are subsequently compared 
with the estimates of average variances from the pre-event windows of equal length. 
The evidence indicates that a marked increase in unconditional volatility takes place 
around the election date. Wilcoxon signed-rank and Fisher tests are employed to affirm 
the statistical significance of this increase. Although the first of these tests has 
frequently been applied in the literature, to the best knowledge of the authors there has 
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not been a single application of the Fisher test in the event-study context as of yet. 
Consequently, some words of clarification are in order.  
The design of the Fisher test has been inspired by the work of Fisher (1932) and 
Maddala and Wu (1999). The null hypothesis for this test can be written as 
 ,:0 iallforVarianceEventPreVarianceEventH ii −=  (10) 
against the alternative 
 , :1 ioffractiontsignificanaforVarianceEventPreVarianceEventH ii −>  (11) 
where i = 1,…,N denotes the event subscript. Essentially, the null is a composite 
hypothesis because it imparts N sub-hypotheses. One could test the variance constancy 
for each i using a simple F-test, and the significance level pi could be obtained. It 
follows that, under the null, ( )ipln2−  is 2χ  distributed with two degrees of freedom 
and the ultimate test statistic ( )∑ =−= Ni ipTestFisher 1ln2  has a 2χ  distribution with 2N 
degrees of freedom.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 shows that, irrespective of the choice of the event window, both the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank and Fisher tests strongly reject the hypothesis of variance 
constancy. To illustrate the inflation in unconditional variance even further, we adopt a 
simple rolling regression approach which can be described as follows. Given any fixed 
day in the event window, we compute logged unconditional variances over the last 25 
trading days for every election included in our sample. These logged variances are 
subsequently regressed against a constant term. This calculation is repeated for every 
day in the event window and the regression constants are plotted in Fig. 2. The pattern 
that emerges strongly attests to the existence of election surprise. 
[Fig. 2 about here] 
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7. Implications for investors 
 
7.1. Compensation for risk 
It is commonsensical to expect increased return variability during periods of 
political change. It is, however, less obvious whether investors are adequately 
compensated for taking this political risk. To address this question, we conduct a simple 
event-study analysis. We define abnormal returns as the difference between returns on 
the election country stock market index and the global index. The abnormal returns are 
subsequently averaged across all events and cumulated over the relevant event window 
(n1,n2) to obtain an estimate of cumulative abnormal return (CAR(n1,n2)). The statistical 
significance of CAR(n1,n2) is evaluated using the following t-statistic: 
 
)(ˆ)1(
),(
)),((
12
21
21
tARraVnn
nnCARnnCARt ⋅+−= , (12) 
where )(ˆ tARraV  is the estimate of variance of the average abnormal returns computed 
in the time-series dimension.  
The magnitude of CARs reported in Table 6 does not seem excessive. The 
additional compensation to an investor who is prepared to abandon a strategy of 
international diversification and invest all of her money in countries facing elections is 
about 33 basis points in the (-25,25) event window. None of the reported CARs in Table 
6 is statistically significant, and several estimates for shorter sub-periods are negatively 
signed. Although the reported risk premiums appear quite modest, they would provide 
an adequate compensation if the average level of investors’ risk aversion was 
sufficiently low.  
 22
Given certain assumptions, it can be shown (see Appendix) that a representative 
investor with constant relative risk aversion will be content with the risk compensation 
offered by the market if her relative risk-aversion (RRA) coefficient ),( 21 nnγ  is below 
a certain break-point level ( )21 ,nnBγ . If, on the other hand, ),( 21 nnγ  > ( )21 ,nnBγ , the 
optimal decision for the investor will be to cease investing all of her money in countries 
awaiting elections and pursue a strategy of international portfolio diversification. The 
parameter ( )21 ,nnBγ  can be estimated from the underlying data as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]21*212121 ,~ˆ,~ˆ,21,ˆ nnRraVnnRraVnnCARnn iB −÷+=γ , (13) 
where ),(~ 21 nnRi  and ),(
~
21
* nnR  are the cumulative log returns on the election country 
index and the global index, respectively. ( )[ ]21 ,~ˆ nnRraV i  and ( )[ ]21* ,~ˆ nnRraV  denote the 
estimates of cross-sectional variances thereof.  
[Fig. 3 about here] 
[Table 6 about here] 
The task of drawing any generalized conclusions, at this stage, should be 
approached with great caution, especially given the fact that the literature does not 
provide any consensus estimate of the average investors’ risk aversion. An analysis of 
households’ asset composition by Friend and Blume (1975) reveals that the RRA 
coefficient is slightly above two. Gertner (1993) examines risky decisions of contestants 
on the television game show “Card Sharks” and reports a lower bound for the risk-
aversion estimate of 4.8. A similar study of the Dutch word game “Lingo” by Beetsma 
and Schotman (2001) concludes that the parameter is close to seven. Last but not least, 
the risk-aversion coefficient that is needed to explain the magnitude of the historical 
equity premium in the United States is around 19 (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Campbell 
et al., 1997).  
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The academic discussion on the risk attitudes of a representative agent is unlikely 
to be settled in the near future. Our pragmatic recommendation for anyone who 
considers investment in a country facing an election, however, would be to measure 
their own RRA coefficient. This individual estimate should be subsequently compared 
with the figures reported in the last column of Table 6 in order to determine the optimal 
choice of strategy. It can be seen that an investment over the longest event window 
requires a risk-aversion coefficient of less than 1.57. Furthermore, one would have to 
exhibit risk-loving behavior to benefit from investments made on the Election Day and 
liquidated within the next two weeks. A robust conclusion that can be reached is that 
everyone with an RRA coefficient greater than 4.21 should definitely avoid investing all 
of their money in a country with upcoming elections. The compensation for risk will, in 
this case, be incommensurate and the strategy of international portfolio diversification 
will yield higher expected utility.  
 
7.2. Option pricing and possible trading strategies 
Savvy investors are likely to realize that the stock market tends to be mercurial in 
nature during election periods. If they incorporate this information into their decision-
making, prices of financial options will move to reflect it. This nexus between option 
market and political risk has not gone completely unnoticed in the literature. Gemmill 
(1992) reports that, in the last two weeks of the British 1987 election campaign, implied 
volatility of the FTSE 100 options almost doubled. Sharp increases were also observed 
for blue-chip companies that were likely to be renationalized if Labour won the election. 
These results illustrate the strong interdependence between the spot and option markets.  
We check whether the findings of Gemmill (1992) can be reconfirmed in an 
international sample. The implied volatility indexes are, however, unavailable for many 
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of the countries considered, and most of them have not been constructed until the turn 
of this decade. The available data permit an analysis of option market behavior around 
15 elections in 11 countries. The time series are sourced from Thomson Financial 
Datastream and an exact description of the sample composition can be found in Table 7. 
Given the data at hand, an average implied volatility is computed across all elections 
and plotted in Fig. 4. 
 [Table 7 about here] 
[Fig. 4 about here] 
Fig. 4 offers compelling evidence that options tend to be more expensive in 
periods when voters cast their ballots. The average implied volatility jumps from 31.2% 
five days before the election to 55.5% five days thereafter. Interestingly, not much of 
the upward move is observed prior to the event. This may suggest that investors did not 
anticipate the extent of their surprise on the Election Day. As a consequence, strategies 
of buying straddles and strangles prior to the elections could have proven quite 
lucrative. Although a more extensive study would be needed to affirm the profitability, 
our preliminary results indicate that these volatility-based option trading strategies may 
have had some success in the past.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This study investigates the interplay between politics and finance by focusing on 
stock market volatility around national elections. The value added of this paper is 
twofold. First, it provides a detailed examination of the second moment of index return 
distribution around election dates. Since much of the uncertainty regarding future 
government policies is resolved during balloting periods, the stock prices can adjust 
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dramatically and stock market volatility is likely to increase. To the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, it is the first study that rigorously quantifies the magnitude of this increase. 
Second, we stretch the limits of earlier research by overcoming the commonly used 
single-country approach and by introducing a new, extensive set of explanatory 
variables. 
The impact of elections on country-specific stock market volatility is assessed in 
an event-study framework. Our empirical findings indicate that, despite many efforts to 
accurately predict election outcomes, investors are still surprised by the ultimate 
distribution of votes. Stock prices react strongly in response to this surprise, and 
temporarily elevated levels of volatility are observed. These empirical conclusions hold 
irrespective of the choice of event window. Narrowing the event window, however, 
magnifies the implied percentage change in variance, suggesting that most of this hike 
is due to large market moves on the Election Day. We find that the country-specific 
component of volatility can easily double during the week surrounding elections. 
To track down the main determinants of election-induced volatility, we have 
compiled an encompassing data set of political, institutional, and socio-economic 
variables. Four of the variables proved to influence the magnitude of election surprise in 
a significant way. Stock market participants tend to react in a more volatile manner 
during closely contested races, when the outcome of the election brings about a change 
in the political orientation of the government, and when governments do not secure 
parliamentary majorities. In all of these cases, investors perceive increased uncertainty. 
On the other hand, compulsory voting laws reduce the election shock. Enactment of 
such laws leads to higher voter turnout, which improves the accuracy of pre-election 
surveys and reduces the chances that the election outcome will be influenced by 
political fringe groups.  
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Our empirical findings are robust to alternative ways of measuring excess 
volatility around the Election Day. When examining the total variance rather than its 
country-specific component, we still observe an evident jump. The statistical 
significance of this increase is reconfirmed by both parametric and non-parametric tests. 
The link between the magnitude of the election shock and the explanatory variables 
mentioned above also seems to be uncontroversial since these variables retain their 
statistical significance in alternative specifications of the regression equation. 
The implications for investors are tangible and important. Risk-averse agents 
require an adequate premium whenever they need to take on additional risks. Typical 
investors are not fully diversified internationally, and it may occasionally happen that 
they see all of their wealth invested in a country with upcoming election. Therefore, the 
investigation into whether investors are appropriately compensated for bearing political 
risk associated with elections is crucial. It turns out that the premium offered for the 
election risk is rather modest and acceptable only for investors with a relatively low 
degree of risk aversion. All other investors will attain higher expected utility by 
diversifying their portfolio internationally. Furthermore, we show that national elections 
can be considered as important events by the participants of option markets. In the heat 
of political changes, options tend to trade at higher implied volatilities.  
 In the light of the presented results, it becomes clear that the efforts to provide 
more accurate pre-election forecasts should still be furthered. Improvements in 
forecasting precision will help to bridge the gap between actual investors’ requirements 
and the current state of the art. With the emergence of accurate prediction markets, 
however, one could envision that advances in this field can be achieved in the future. 
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Appendix 
 
A representative agent is assumed to invest all of her initial wealth 
1n
W  in risky 
assets. The investment decision is made right now (time n1), and the portfolio 
composition will remain unaltered until some future date n2 at which the investment will 
be liquidated. The agent chooses to maximize the expectation of her constant relative 
risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function 
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where ),(~ 21 nnR  is the cumulative, continuously compounded return on the portfolio 
over the entire investment period and ),( 21 nnγ  is the agent’s relative risk-aversion 
(RRA) coefficient ( 1),( 21 ≠nnγ ). Note that, although the RRA coefficient is allowed to 
vary across different investment horizons, for any fixed horizon it does not change 
across different investment alternatives.  
Given the normality of ),(~ 21 nnR , the expression for the expected utility of 
terminal wealth can be derived using a formula for the expected value of log-normal 
distribution: 
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Suppose further that elections are scheduled to take place in the agent’s home 
country during her investment period (n1,n2). It is assumed for simplicity that the agent 
can pursue only two mutually exclusive strategies. She could either invest domestically 
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or diversify her portfolio internationally. Her expected utility is influenced by this 
choice of strategy as follows: 
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where ),(~ 21 nnRi  and ),(
~
21
* nnR  denote the cumulative log return on the stock market 
index in the election country and the cumulative log return on the global stock market 
index, respectively. 
In the case when ( )[ ]21 ,~ nnRE i  ≠ ( )[ ]21* ,~ nnRE  and ( )[ ]21 ,~ nnRVar i  ≠ 
( )[ ]21* ,~ nnRVar , the agent will be indifferent between the two investment alternatives if 
and only if her risk-aversion coefficient ( )21 ,nnγ  is equal to a break-point RRA 
coefficient ( )21 ,nnBγ , such that 
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Solving the above equation for ( )21 ,nnBγ  yields 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]21*2121*2121 ,~,~,~,~21, nnRVarnnRVarnnREnnREnn iiB −÷−+=γ . (18) 
It can be shown that, in the presence of election-induced volatility 
( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]( )0,~,~i.e. 21*21 >− nnRVarnnRVar i , the agent’s optimal investment decision can 
be described as  
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(A.5) provides insights into the estimation of the break-point relative risk-aversion 
coefficient ( )21 ,nnBγ  from the underlying data. Given that ( )21 , nnCAR  is defined as 
cumulative excess return on the domestic market index over the international one, the 
estimator of ( )21 ,nnBγ  can be written as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]21*212121 ,~ˆ,~ˆ,21,ˆ nnRraVnnRraVnnCARnn iB −÷+=γ , (20) 
where ( )[ ]21 ,~ˆ nnRraV i  and ( )[ ]21* ,~ˆ nnRraV  denote the estimates of cross-sectional 
variances of cumulative log returns on the domestic and global stock market indexes, 
respectively.  
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 Figure 1: 
Cumulative abnormal volatility around Election Day 
 
 
Note: The first panel plots the cumulative abnormal volatility around 134 national elections 
in 27 countries. The theoretical p-value shown in the second panel comes from a χ2 test for 
the null hypothesis of no change in the country-specific component of volatility. The last 
panel depicts the p-value based on the empirical distribution of cumulative abnormal 
volatilities generated using 5,000 bootstrap samples. Both the theoretical and bootstrap p-
values are truncated at the 0.2 level. 
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Figure 2: 
Rolling regression intercept 
 
 
Note: Given any fixed day in the event window, logged unconditional variances over the 
last 25 trading days are computed for 134 elections included in our sample. The logged 
variances are subsequently regressed against a constant term. This calculation is repeated 
for every day in the event window, and the constant is plotted in the graph above. 
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Figure 3: 
Cumulative abnormal return around Election Day 
 
 
Note: The abnormal returns are defined as the difference between returns on the election 
country stock market index and the global index. The abnormal returns are subsequently 
averaged across all 134 elections and cumulated over the relevant event window. The 
resulting estimate of cumulative abnormal return is plotted above.  
 39
Figure 4: 
Average implied volatility around Election Day 
 
 
Note: This figure plots the average of implied volatility indexes around 15 national 
elections held in 11 countries. 
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Table 1: 
Data availability and sample composition 
Country Election type MSCI index starting date 
First election 
included 
Last election 
included 
Number of 
elections 
Australia Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 5-Mar-83 9-Oct-04 9 
Austria Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 24-Apr-83 24-Nov-02 7 
Belgium Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 13-Oct-85 18-May-03 6 
Canada Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 4-Sep-84 28-Jun-04 6 
Czech Republic Parliamentary 4-Jan-94 20-Jun-98 14-Jun-02 2 
Denmark Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 10-Jan-84 20-Nov-01 7 
Finland Parliamentary 1-Jan-87 17-Mar-91 16-Mar-03 4 
France Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 16-Mar-86 9-Jun-02 5 
Germany Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 3-Mar-83 22-Sep-02 6 
Greece Parliamentary 1-Jun-01 7-Mar-04 7-Mar-04 1 
Hungary Parliamentary 2-Jan-95 10-May-98 7-Apr-02 2 
Ireland Parliamentary 4-Jan-88 25-Nov-92 18-May-02 3 
Italy Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 26-Jun-83 13-May-01 6 
Japan Parliamentary 2-Jan-80 18-Dec-83 9-Nov-03 7 
Korea Presidential 1-Jan-88 18-Dec-92 19-Dec-02 3 
Mexico Presidential 1-Jan-88 21-Aug-94 2-Jul-00 2 
Netherlands Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 8-Sep-82 22-Jan-03 7 
New Zealand Parliamentary 2-Jan-87 27-Oct-90 27-Jul-02 5 
Norway Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 8-Sep-85 10-Sep-01 5 
Poland Parliamentary 1-Jan-93 21-Sep-97 23-Sep-01 2 
Portugal Parliamentary 4-Jan-88 6-Oct-91 17-Mar-02 4 
Spain Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 28-Oct-82 14-Mar-04 7 
Sweden Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 19-Sep-82 15-Sep-02 7 
Switzerland Parliamentary 2-Jan-80 23-Oct-83 19-Oct-03 6 
Turkey Parliamentary 4-Jan-88 20-Oct-91 3-Nov-02 4 
United Kingdom Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 9-Jun-83 7-Jun-01 5 
United States Presidential 1-Jan-80 6-Nov-84 2-Nov-04 6 
    Total 134 
Note: The first column lists all of the 27 countries included in our sample. The relevant type of election and 
the date from which daily stock prices for the respective MSCI Country Indexes became available in 
Datastream are given in the following two columns. For any given country, the first election included is the 
first election that took place at least 500 trading days after the index starting date. This sample selection 
requirement allows estimating the volatility benchmark model. The date of the last election included 
corresponds to the most recent election that took place before the end of 2004.  
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Table 2: 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 25
th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
Parliamentary 0.9179 0.2755 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Minority_Government 0.2463 0.4325 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Margin_of_Victory -0.0281 0.2126 -0.1593 -0.0560 0.0592 
Number_of_Parties 2.2015 1.2965 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 
∆Orientation 0.3209 0.4686 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Early_Election 0.4179 0.4951 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Compulsory_Voting 0.2090 0.4081 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ln_Population 16.8395 1.1945 15.8873 16.5974 17.8599 
Ln_GDP_per_Capita 9.7472 0.5781 9.5720 9.8729 10.0955 
Note: Descriptive statistics for a set of variables that are likely to influence election-induced volatility are reported above. The data 
set consists of 134 elections held in 27 OECD countries. Parliamentary is a dummy variable which takes a value of one for 
parliamentary elections and zero for presidential elections. Minority_Government is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if 
the government fails to hold a majority of seats in parliament and zero otherwise. Margin_of_Victory is defined as the difference 
between the percentage of votes obtained by government and opposition for parliamentary elections and the corresponding 
difference between winner and runner-up for presidential elections. Number_of_Parties denotes the number of independent political 
parties involved in the government in parliamentary systems and takes a value of one for presidential systems. ∆Orientation is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of one for a change in the political orientation of the government and zero otherwise. 
Early_Election takes a value of one when elections are called before time and zero otherwise. Compulsory_Voting takes a value of 
one if a given country has mandatory voting laws and zero otherwise. Ln_Population and Ln_GDP_per_Capita are the natural 
logarithms of total population and GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) in a given country-year, respectively. 
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Table 3: 
Cumulative abnormal volatility around Election Day 
Window ),( 21 nnCAV  
Implied percentage 
change 
Theoretical 
p-value 
Bootstrap 
p-value 
Panel A: Symmetric event windows 
(-2,2) 5.3675 107.3500 0.0000 0.0016 
(-5,5) 6.8504 62.2764 0.0000 0.0026 
(-10,10) 7.9387 37.8033 0.0000 0.0048 
(-25,25) 11.9437 23.4190 0.0000 0.0076 
Panel B: Asymmetric event windows 
(0,2) 5.3655 268.2750 0.0000 0.0000 
(0,5) 6.6115 132.2300 0.0000 0.0000 
(0,10) 7.2652 72.6520 0.0000 0.0018 
(0,25) 8.6725 34.6900 0.0000 0.0054 
Note: The data set consists of 134 elections held in 27 OECD countries. Panel A of the table reports 
cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV) in windows centered on the Election Day, whereas Panel B reports the 
results for asymmetric event windows. The implied percentage change in country-specific volatility relative to 
the benchmark is reported in the third column. Theoretical p-values come from a χ2 test for the null 
hypothesis of no change in country-specific volatility. The last column reports bootstrap p-values obtained 
from the empirical distribution of CAVs developed under the null, using 5,000 iterations. 
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Table 4: 
Determinants of excess volatility 
Variable Expected sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 
 
? 
 
 0.1143* 
(0.0688) 
 0.1594 
(0.2385) 
 0.0526 
(0.2449) 
 0.0029 
(0.2495) 
 1.8998 
(1.8072) 
Margin_of_Victory 
 
- 
 
-0.6697** 
(0.3300) 
-0.6793** 
(0.3411) 
-0.7462** 
(0.3527)  
-0.7702** 
(0.3538) 
Parliamentary 
 
? 
  
-0.0494 
(0.2528) 
-0.2115 
(0.2740) 
-0.1713 
(0.2719) 
-0.2990 
(0.3414) 
Early_Election 
 
+ 
   
 0.0892 
(0.1403) 
 0.1376 
(0.1418) 
 0.1003 
(0.1478) 
∆Orientation 
 
+ 
   
 0.3229** 
(0.1430) 
 0.3805*** 
(0.1431) 
 0.2997** 
(0.1482) 
Compulsory_Voting 
 
- 
   
-0.3145** 
(0.1550) 
-0.2176 
(0.1556) 
-0.3651** 
(0.1701) 
Number_of_Parties 
 
+ 
   
 0.0811 
(0.0582) 
 0.0397 
(0.0552) 
 0.0933 
(0.0578) 
Minority_Government 
 
+ 
    
 0.2675* 
(0.1608)  
Ln_Population 
 
- 
     
-0.0356 
(0.0679) 
Ln_GDP_per_Capita 
 
- 
     
-0.1213 
(0.1221) 
Adjusted R2  2.56% 1.85% 6.08% 4.93% 5.52% 
Note: This table presents results of regressions linking election-induced volatility to several explanatory variables. The dependent variable is a natural 
logarithm of the volatility ratio, defined as a quotient of the return variance computed over the (-25,25) event window and the variance of returns in a pre-
event window of equal length, i.e. (-76,-26). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980) are given in parentheses. The data set consists 
of 134 elections held in 27 OECD countries. Margin_of_Victory is defined as the difference between the percentage of votes obtained by government and 
opposition for parliamentary elections and the corresponding difference between winner and runner-up for presidential elections. Parliamentary is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of one for parliamentary elections and zero for presidential elections. Early_Election takes a value of one when 
elections are called before time and zero otherwise. ∆Orientation is a dummy variable which takes a value of one for a change in the political orientation 
of the government and zero otherwise. Compulsory_Voting takes a value of one if a given country has mandatory voting laws and zero otherwise. 
Number_of_Parties denotes the number of independent political parties involved in the government in parliamentary systems and takes a value of one for 
presidential systems. Minority_Government is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the government fails to hold a majority of seats in 
parliament and zero otherwise. Ln_Population and Ln_GDP_per_Capita are the natural logarithms of total population and GDP per capita (in constant 
2000 US$) in a given country-year, respectively. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: 
Change in unconditional variance 
Event 
window 
Event 
variance 
(%) 
Pre-event 
window 
Pre-event 
variance 
(%) 
Percentage 
change 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
test 
Fisher test 
Panel A: Symmetric event windows 
(-2,2) 0.0166 (-7,-3) 0.0104 58.8283 2.9081*** 397.54*** 
(-5,5) 0.0165 (-16,-6) 0.0112 47.9641 5.4088*** 498.43*** 
(-10,10) 0.0159 (-31,-11) 0.0132 20.6038 2.9015*** 559.09*** 
(-25,25) 0.0158 (-76,-26) 0.0138 14.2509 2.3107** 908.30*** 
Panel B: Asymmetric event windows 
(0,2) 0.0138 (-3,-1) 0.0068 103.4263 2.8460*** 388.73*** 
(0,5) 0.0166 (-6,-1) 0.0106 56.1312 3.4234*** 418.39*** 
(0,10) 0.0164 (-11,-1) 0.0123 33.5528 3.9053*** 451.58*** 
(0,25) 0.0161 (-26,-1) 0.0134 20.1656 2.8748*** 610.43*** 
Note: This table reports the change in unconditional variance calculated for 134 elections held in 27 OECD 
countries. Panel A of the table reports unconditional variances in windows centered on the Election Day, 
whereas Panel B reports the results for asymmetric event windows. In any row of the table, the event and pre-
event windows have equal length. The event and pre-event variance denote the geometric averages of the 
unconditional variance estimators computed for all elections. The fifth column reports the percentage increase in 
average unconditional variance relative to its pre-event level. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic follows a 
standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis of no change in variance. Given the validity of the null, 
the Fisher test statistic is χ2 distributed with 268 degrees of freedom. ***, ** denote statistical significance at the 
1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: 
Cumulative abnormal returns around Election Day 
Window ),( 21 nnCAR in % t-statistic p-value RRA coefficient 
Panel A: Symmetric event windows 
(-2,2) 0.2283 0.4865 0.6274 3.9980 
(-5,5) 0.5480 0.9937 0.3221 4.2057 
(-10,10) 0.1699 0.2580 0.7968 1.5848 
(-25,25) 0.3297 0.3456 0.7302 1.5696 
Panel B: Asymmetric event windows 
(0,2) -0.2512 -0.9123 0.3632 -2.2143 
(0,5) -0.3187 -1.1960 0.2338 -0.7994 
(0,10) -0.3738 -1.1421 0.2555 -0.7150 
(0,25) 0.3182 0.4830 0.6299 1.9644 
Note: This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated around 134 elections held in 27 
OECD countries. Panel A of the table reports CARs in windows centered on the Election Day, whereas 
Panel B reports the results for asymmetric event windows. CAR is defined as the average excess return 
on the election country index over the MSCI World Index, cumulated over time. The t-statistics with the 
corresponding p-values are calculated for the null hypothesis of no compensation for the election risk. 
The RRA coefficient denotes the break-point level of the constant relative risk-aversion coefficient above 
which the strategy of international portfolio diversification yields higher expected utility than the strategy 
of investing in election countries.  
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Table 7: 
Implied volatility indexes 
Country Datastream code Index starting date 
First election 
included 
Last election 
included 
Number of 
elections 
Austria ATXC.SERIESC 21-Jul-99 03-Oct-99 24-Nov-02 2 
Czech Republic CTXC.SERIESC 16-Feb-00 14-Jun-02 14-Jun-02 1 
France CACLC.SERIESC 5-Jan-00 9-Jun-02 9-Jun-02 1 
Germany DAXC.SERIESC 19-Jul-99 22-Sep-02 22-Sep-02 1 
Japan JPNC.SERIESC 10-Mar-00 25-Jun-00 9-Nov-03 2 
Mexico MEXC.SERIESC 10-Mar-00 02-Jul-00 2-Jul-00 1 
Netherlands EOEC.SERIESC 24-Aug-99 15-May-02 22-Jan-03 2 
Poland PTXC.SERIESC 16-Feb-00 23-Sep-01 23-Sep-01 1 
Switzerland SMIC.SERIESC 1-Mar-00 19-Oct-03 19-Oct-03 1 
United Kingdom LSXC.SERIESC 05-Jan-00 7-Jun-01 7-Jun-01 1 
United States ISXC.SERIESC 11-Aug-99 7-Nov-00 2-Nov-04 2 
    Total 15 
Note: The first column lists all of the 11 sample countries that have implied volatility indexes available in 
Datastream. The second column provides the relevant Datastream code, and the third one indicates the series 
starting date. The dates of the first and last election included as well as the total number of elections for each 
of the sample countries are reported in the following columns. 
 
